Final-Stage Complaints Handling for public services report of findings and recommendations

2

REPORT

The Assistant  Minister  for  Sustainable  Economic  Development  and  External Relations, Deputy Moz Scott , has completed her review of the final stage public service complaints handling, as requested by the Chief Minister.

While  recognising  the  admirable  work  of  the  volunteers  on  the  States  of  Jersey Complaints Panel, Deputy Scott 's report supports the introduction of new Public Sector Ombudsperson and  recommends that a  road  map  for  implementation be  developed along with policy measures to support efficiency and containment of cost.  

The Council of Ministers have considered the findings of report and thank Deputy Scott for the diligence and commitment she has brought to this important area. The report is a helpful contribution to the debate.

The Council  of  Ministers also wishes to  place  on  record  its  sincere  thanks  to  the members of the States of Jersey Complaints Panel. Islanders need an independent mechanism to make complaints about public services and the decisions of Ministers, and the Panel often face some of the most difficult cases. Whatever decisions are taken in  the  future  about  our  institutions  and  complaints  handling  processes,  Ministers appreciate the ongoing dedication, expertise, and voluntary contribution of all the Panel Members.

R.50/2026

Table of Contents

Assistant Minister's Foreword ....................................... 3

Executive Summary ............................................. 5

Key Findings ................................................... 5

Key Recommendations ........................................... 7

Introduction ................................................... 10

The Complaint-handling Landscape ................................ 11

Current Complaints Panel Framework .............................. 12

Different approach of PSO towards Administrative Justice ............... 13

Comparing the Complaints Panel with the PSO concept ................. 14

Final Proposals for a Complaint-Handling System ....................... 23

Scope ..................................................... 24

User friendliness ............................................. 25

Transparency and privacy ....................................... 25

Keeping Operational costs low (including use of existing infrastructure) ...... 26

Precision of jurisdiction including governance framework and enforcement powers

 .............................................................................................................................. 28 Conclusion and Next Steps ...................................................................................... 30 ANNEX I Terms of Reference: Public Services Ombudsperson Project .................. 31

1. Introduction ....................................................................................................... 31
2. Purpose............................................................................................................. 31
3. Scope ................................................................................................................ 31
4. Timing ............................................................................................................... 32
5. Governance ...................................................................................................... 32

ANNEX II – Research Methodology ......................................................................... 33 ANNEX III – Detailed Findings ................................................................................. 35 Overarching Final-Stage Complaint-handling System .......................................... 35 Scope of review of the Complaints Panel ............................................................. 37 States of Jersey Complaints Panel ....................................................................... 38

Key Differences: Ombudsperson and Complaints Panel ...................................... 41

Prior Support and Mandate for an Ombud scheme............................................... 45

Civic Engagement and Trust ................................................................................. 46

Improvement to Public Services and performance management .......................... 47

Return on investment ............................................................................................ 48

Compliance: Acceptance and Enforcement of Findings and Recommendations .. 50

Consideration of Tribunal Services ....................................................................... 51

Cost of Public Services Ombudsperson ................................................................ 52 ANNEX IV Discussion of Policy Options from Cost Benefit Analysis ....................... 55

Option 1: Business as Usual - Existing States of Jersey Complaints Panel .......... 55

Option 2: Non-legislative improvements to the current system ............................. 56

Option 3: Creating independent Jersey Public Services Ombudsperson with new

legal framework..................................................................................................... 57

Option 4: Creating Independent Jersey Public Services Ombudsperson with new

legal framework and including Health Complaints ................................................ 58 ANNEX V - Feedback on public services consultation (Key findings) ...................... 62

Expectation of public services ............................................................................... 62

Complaints against public services ....................................................................... 62

Processing of complaints ...................................................................................... 62

Outcome of complaint ........................................................................................... 62

Final-stage complaint handling ............................................................................. 63

States of Jersey Complaints Panel ....................................................................... 64

Local Administrative Redress................................................................................ 64 Annex VI: Summary Report: the Experiences and Views of States Members.......... 65

Introduction ........................................................................................................... 65

Analysis................................................................................................................. 65 Annex VII: Retention of the Complaints Panel vs Establishment of Ombud Scheme

 ................................................................................................................................. 74

Assistant Minister's Foreword

In October 2024, the Chief Minister tasked me with leading  the  next  phase  of  developing  a  final-stage  complaint- handling mechanism to reform or replace the current States  of Jersey Complaints Panel. This included evaluating the  potential  establishment  of  a  Jersey  Public  Services  Ombudsperson (JPSO).  

This  report  presents  my  final  findings  and  recommendations. These include the prioritisation by the  current  and  future  Councils  of  Ministers  of  the  establishment  of  a  fit-for-purpose  JPSO,  appropriately  scaled for Jersey and adequately resourced to conduct  proportionate investigations within a new primary legislative framework.

In our small community, grievances are easily aired on local media and social media. Justice is not necessarily achieved through the spectacle of a public hearing. A public consultation indicates a preference for thorough investigations and outcome-based resolutions.

The report addresses two principal areas of debate:

1. the Panel's lack of teeth'; and
2. concerns that the financial cost of adopting an Ombudsman model outweighs its benefits for the public.

The report also considers the issue of independence; it is important not to conflate this with administrative ownership.

My analysis includes detailed findings, an overview of the research methodology, and a cost analysis based on available government data. Personal details identifying individuals providing testimonies have not been disclosed for privacy reasons.

Significant gaps in information were a barrier to gap and cost analysis and highlight the need for substantial reform in complaint handling. Gaps in information included:

• The  absence  of  centralised  and  consistent  logging  of  complaints  across  a convoluted public services landscape, leading to duplication and misdirection;

• Limited  cooperation  from  organisations outside  the  Government  of  Jersey  in providing complaint-related information;

• The lack of standardised time recording across departments, impeding accurate assessment of resources dedicated to complaint response; and

• Difficulty in determining how many individuals do not pursue complaints due to the complexity  of  the  current  system,  resulting  in  alternative  expressions  of dissatisfaction such as media complaints or disengagement.

My recommendations therefore have extended beyond the review process to include broader policy and organisational reforms I consider desirable and necessary to support the establishment of a JPSO and to  help manage its operational costs effectively.

Many Islanders and government officers have shared experiences of a system that is overly complex and under-resourced. For some, systemic flaws have resulted in significant personal loss or hardship and psychological stress. It is essential to provide effective routes for redress to ensure citizens receive a professional service that employs generally recognisable best practice administrative review standards.

A JPSO would help embed a culture of timely, effective complaint resolution, reducing escalation, complexity, and unnecessary costs, this would provide strong social value, improve delivery standards, and help public services to meet public expectations. While limitations on funding must be considered, there is compelling evidence that an ombud scheme would enhance service quality, accountability, and civic engagement. Not all benefits are measurable, yet most are vital to meeting community needs, shaping public trust in government, and supporting a good international reputation.

I am grateful to the members of the public, States Members, government and States Greffe officers, organisations, and volunteers whose contributions have informed this report. I also express gratitude to the volunteers on the States of Jersey Complaints Panel and the Jersey Police Complaints Authority for the time and dedication they have given to their respective roles.

In  the  course of  finalising  the  report,  the  Panel  and  Privileges and  Procedures Committee (PPC), amongst other authorities, were invited to review and fact-check statements regarding them prior to finalisation. It is acknowledged that this task is difficult when certain testimonies cannot be disclosed for privacy reasons.

Public servants must act impartially and exercise appropriate caution when expressing views on political decisions. I commend the professionalism shown by the policy officers who assisted in the preparation of this report and thank them for the care and diligence they brought to their work.

Deputy Moz Scott

Assistant Minister for Sustainable Economic Development and External Relations

Executive Summary

This report builds upon extensive research by the Law Commission, Comptroller and Auditor General ("the C&AG"), Public Accounts Committee ("the PAC"), and government policy officers.

Public and political support for administrative reform was confirmed by the States Assembly's adoption of P.32/2018, which approved the principle of establishing a Public Services Ombudsperson (PSO). Work on the necessary legislation slowed after initial law drafting instructions were approved in 2022 and early-stage draft legislation was developed. Some lobbyists have questioned the desirability of continuing such work while others have complained about the delay in implementation. This prompted the Chief Minister to commission Deputy Scott to lead the next phase including consideration of the options of reform of the existing Complaints Panel and the creation of a new Public Service Ombudsperson ("PSO").

The main objection to an Ombudsperson has been concern over increased public cost. However, bringing the Panel up to international standards to address key barriers to meeting best practice in administrative justice would likely cost as much.

While not seeking to fully replicate a tribunal's process, a PSO would use a well- designed and robust investigatory method, distinct from current parliamentary-style hearings, that borrows key judicial principles to ensure findings feel fair to all sides and can withstand scrutiny.

The current Complaints Panel process lacks clarity on complaint grounds and facts, which  unfortunately  has  undermined  trust  in  that  process.  Notwithstanding  the observations and recommendations made in preceding reports, residual significant weaknesses remain in the current system, which relies heavily upon the goodwill and public-spirited  nature  of  volunteers,  rather  than  a  professionalised,  adequately resourced, and appropriately scaled service.

These  issues  stem  partly  from  the  outdated  Administrative  Decisions  (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 ("the 1982 Law"), which creates barriers for complainants and officers while failing to offer a framework to deliver sufficient redress or service improvements and using officer time inefficiently.

Deputy Scott has made 12 key findings and 11 key recommendations, including replacing the Complaints Panel with an independently administered Jersey Public Services  Ombudsperson  ("the  JPSO"),  supported  by  legislation  that  ensures independence and accountability, including financial accountability.

Key Findings

Finding 1:

Proposals for reform need to be considered in the context of Jersey's public-service complaint-handling processes and final-stage review mechanisms as a whole. These have  notable  structural  and  organisational  weaknesses.  Coverage  can  be inconsistent,  and  complainants  often  face  uncertainty  about  which  authority  is  responsible for reviewing a complaint. These gaps create confusion and reduce confidence in the system. Recent efforts have led to improvements in accessibility and navigability  of  the  Government  of  Jersey  complaint-handling  processes.  While representing positive steps toward a more user-friendly framework, it is not used consistently and does not have reach across the whole spectrum of public services.

Finding 2:

Although  the  States  of  Jersey  Complaints  Panel  operates  as  a  well-organised complaint-handling service, and the States Greffier has invested in increasing public awareness of the service, its processes fall materially short of the standards typically associated  with  an  ombud  scheme.  In  consequence,  the  processes  have  lost credibility while supporting a narrative that the main obstacle to the Panel having its recommendations accepted by Ministers is a lack of teeth.'

Finding 3:

Despite the Complaints Panel providing an organised, low-cost, complaint review mechanism,  there  are  fundamental  structural  weaknesses  in  its  framework  and processes, which has undermined trust in its effectiveness.

Finding 4:

The uniqueness of the Complaints Panel in its approach to the review of complaints, with its attendant flaws, makes the Complaints Panel an outlier in international best practice. A robust final-stage complaint handler in the form of an ombudsperson is a matter of international reputation for Jersey

Finding 5:

Government Departments face challenges when disagreeing with recommendations made by the Complaints Panel, especially where these fall outside of the Department's remit or are misaligned with operational objectives. This can create perceptions of adversarial  dynamics  and  misperceptions  regarding  the  Government's  lack  of compliance,  and  can  conversely,  along  with  concerns  about  the  authority  and credibility of the review process.

Finding 6:

The  existing  operational  budget  is  unlikely  to  be  sufficient  to  establish  a  fully operational JPSO without further consideration of cost containment.

Finding 7:

While cost containment is appropriate, the greater long-term unquantifiable cost lies in retaining a weak system that has lost government officer and public trust and losing an opportunity to enhance redress for citizens, improve trust in Government, and drive genuine service improvements in line with international standards

Finding 8:

The costs of a JPSO would be broadly comparable to fully reforming the existing Complaints Panel to perform the functions of an ombud scheme, but with the added benefits of enhanced independence, professional casework and investigatory staff, ensuring consistency and quality and improved public trust.

Finding 9:

An ombud scheme model, whereby the reviewer acts as an impartial watchdog rather than a regulator, aligns better with constitutional separation of political, administrative, and judicial roles and accountability and is more likely to achieve compliance with recommendations via its outcome focussed approach.

Finding 10:

Consideration could be given to a PSO acting as an independent resource for other statutory bodies performing regulatory appeal or review roles to streamline expenses and provide assurance of independence of administrative justice functions.

Finding 11:

There is a lack of clarity and consistency regarding the routes for review or appeals in several areas, including from regulatory decisions, and how the proposed JPSO will interface with regulatory bodies regarding service complaints. The lines between complaints of professional conduct and maladministration also can be blurred.

Finding 12:  

Research shows that, with a PSO in place, administrative processes become more streamlined,  and  organisational  silos  and  inconsistencies  reduced.  The ombudsperson's  role  is  widely  respected  for  providing  fair  and  constructive recommendations, which is reflected in the high proportion of recommendations that are accepted and implemented.

Key Recommendations

Recommendation 1:

A JPSO should be established as a matter of priority to ensure that final-stage complaints are handled fairly, with optimal confidence of all parties in its processes, and to drive continuous public-service improvement. This should be supported by a duty of good administration.

Recommendation 2:

The JPSO should have a bespoke legal framework with robust legal mechanisms to ensure that it acts pragmatically and proportionately while delivering best value in the use of public funds. In addition, the JPSO should:

• Act as a Complaints Standards Authority, setting standards for complaint-handling processes across public services, while advising on structural reforms within the complaint-handling landscape.

• Have the power to initiate own-initiative' investigations where there is evidence of widespread or systemic issues. This proactive capability will maximise the JPSO's potential to deliver meaningful improvements in public-service delivery.

Recommendation 3:

The JPSO should be established with a broad jurisdiction to replace the existing Complaints Panel.

Recommendation 4:

Further policy development work is required to define an appropriate scope for the JPSO, one that achieves comprehensive coverage, avoids duplication, and delivers an effective and efficient complaint-handling framework.

Recommendation 5:

Subsidiary work should be commenced to rationalise and simplify complaint-handling policies and processes across Government and ALOs alongside the establishment of the JPSO. This will improve triaging and signposting for public-service complaints, ensuring a clearer and more efficient complaint-handling landscape.

Recommendation 6:

The JPSO, in its role as the Complaint Standards Authority, should lead a coordinated effort to ensure every service provider publishes clear and accessible Codes of Conduct, Service Standards, and complaint-handling information.

Recommendation 7:

That States Members be provided with complaints handling training by the Greffe to assist with orderly direction, logging and co-ordination of complaints and to support States Members in focusing on policy work.

Recommendation 8:

Further work is required to consider cost containment and ongoing budget to develop a size-appropriate JPSO while ensuring best value for money.

Recommendation 9:

In order to help support the public in highlighting concerns regarding ethical conduct, policy  officers  should  investigate  the  Employment  Law  implications  of  including provision that the JPSO, in consultation with the States Employment Board (SEB), should develop a code of ethical standards for public sector employees and be authorised:

• to  determine  whether  there  has  been  non-compliance  with  that  code  by employees of the SEB; and

• to inform complainants and the SEB of a determination of breach.

Such a determination should be taken into account by the SEB when considering complaints  and  any  disciplinary  matters.  Consideration  should  also  be  given  to extending the code of ethical standards and authorisation to complaints of employees of other public services and to inform their employers accordingly.

Recommendation 10:

The JPSO should have enhanced independence and governance arrangements. Further consideration should be given to:

• The appropriate framework for governance, including sharing a governance board with other regulatory bodies.

• Achieving  financial  and  political  accountability  through  statutory  PAC/C&AG relationships.

Recommendation 11:

A roadmap for implementation of a JPSO, including a refined Proposition to update P.32/2018, should be developed for submission to the next Council of Ministers at the start of the new political term following the election in June 2026.

Introduction

1. The Terms of Reference ("the ToR") required the project to:

1. identify,  blend  and,  where  considered  in  the  Jersey  public  interest, improve upon the best elements of the Complaints Panel and the concept of a Public Services Ombudsperson; and
2. lead to the development of final proposals for a  user-friendly complaint- handling system.

2. This  has  initiated  extensive  research  into  complaint  handling  and  review mechanisms across the broad spectrum of public service provision, including a public consultation and an additional cost-benefit analysis. The "Feedback On Public Services" public consultation took place between 10 March and 6 May 2025 to gather feedback on islanders' experience with public-services complaints processes and their views on how an independent complaint reviewer should operate in Jersey.[1]
3. The content of this Report is structured to address the components of the ToR in the  context  of  Jersey's  complaint-handling  landscape  under  the  following headings, with supporting information included in its Annexes:

• Complaint-handling Landscape

• Comparing the Complaints Panel with the PSO concept

• Development of final proposals for a complaint-handling system, covering:

Scope

User friendliness (incorporating accessibility and complaints resolution mechanism)

Transparency and privacy

Keeping operational costs low (including use of existing infrastructure)

Precision  of  jurisdiction  (including  governance  and  enforcement powers).

4. Annex I sets out the ToR.

Annex II sets out the research methodology.

Annex III presents more detail of findings and recommendations.

Annex IV outlines policy options considered within the cost-benefit analysis. Annex V provides a summary of the key findings from the public consultation.

Annex VI provides a summary report of a survey of the experiences and views of States Members.

Annex VII outlines benefits and risks of both the retention of the Complaints Panel and establishment of an Ombud Scheme.

The Complaint-Handling Landscape

1. Proposals for reform need to be considered in the context of Jersey's convoluted complaint-handling landscape. Despite recent improvements in complaint handling within the Government of Jersey organisation, Deputy Scott considers reform necessary  across  the  full  spectrum  of  public  services  in  which  a  final-stage complaints reviewer should have a key role. The current landscape remains fragmented, siloed, poorly signposted, and confusing, resulting in inconsistencies in  both  the  level  and  quality  of  service  delivery.  Inadequate  triaging  and coordination – including in complaint logging – create duplication and unnecessary time costs. Additional challenges arise from lack of clarity and consistency of governance arrangements and processes for the review of services of regulatory organisations.
2. It is desirable for the Government's complaints-handling service to be used more consistently by the public and States Members with respect to complaints against government departments as a professionalised complaints-handling service that logs complaints against Government departments. Confusion may be caused by government advice to provide feedback to the point of service which could lead to complaints not being consistently logged or a  dedicated complaints handling service being bypassed.
3. Considering the system as a whole, a service dedicated to triaging and signposting within  the  complaint-handling  landscape  would  improve  navigability  for complainants and provide clearer routes for hearing final-stage complaints. This would work to prevent silos and inconsistencies. While different public services involved in handling complaints attempt to be helpful to complainants by re- directing them to appropriate complaint handlers, this can be unnecessarily time consuming for both the complainant and the relevant public service.
4. Complainants have raised, as a further obstacle to administrative justice aside from the costs of obtaining legal advice, the concern that finding local lawyers to help them pursue complaints or grievances against government can be difficult or cumbersome owing to the small size of the island, with a high proportion of law firms being conflicted from acting for complainants, having acted for government. This underscores the reasons why a professional Ombudsperson would have social benefit in a relatively small Island community.
5. States Members were surveyed regarding how much time they spent handling public-service complaints, the types of issues raised, and the challenges these responsibilities create alongside their other duties. Their responses highlighted recurring themes, including inadequate complaint processes, lack of training, and suggestions  for  establishing  the  Jersey  Public  Service  Ombudsperson  ("the JPSO")  to  improve  the  efficiency,  fairness,  and  accountability  of  complaint handling. Some responses expressed a clear support for the establishment of the JPSO, while others supported the Complaints Board in its current form or with adaptations and perhaps more teeth.' Concerns were expressed regarding the cost of establishing an ombudsperson and its proportionality to the needs of the island. (See Annex VI for a detailed report of findings).

6. Citizens Advice Jersey is a valuable resource in supporting citizens through the complaints process that should be more widely advertised within the public sector.

Finding 1: Proposals for reform need to be considered in the context of Jersey's public-service complaint-handling processes and final-stage review mechanisms as a whole. These have notable structural and organisational weaknesses. Coverage can be inconsistent, and complainants often face uncertainty about which authority is responsible for reviewing a complaint. These gaps create confusion and reduce confidence in the system. Recent efforts have led to improvements in accessibility and navigability of the Government of Jersey complaint-handling processes. While representing positive steps toward a more user-friendly framework it is not used consistently and does not have reach across the whole spectrum of public services.

Current Complaints Panel Framework

7. The Complaints Panel's process for investigating and resolving complaints is unique to Jersey, adopting a quasi-tribunal style of public hearings. Its services are delivered by publicly-spirited volunteers with a wide range of experience across senior roles in the private and public sectors. While this process is organised and well-intentioned, it is not sufficiently professionalised. As a result, the process falls materially short of international standards for ombud schemes, including standards for complaint resolution, the protection of individuals' privacy rights, and standards designed  to  ensure  investigation  of  administrative process  and  the  balanced assessment of complaints. Accordingly, it is recognised as a Complaint Handler by the Ombudsman Association and, not having Ombudsman status, does not have full Ombudsman Membership.
8. There is evidence that the Privileges and Procedures Committee ("the PPC"), in bringing changes to the 1982 Law in 2006, intended the States Greffier to act as an investigator with the least possible delay'.[2] The 1982 Law imposes a duty on the Greffier to enquire into the facts'.[3] The Greffier and the team supporting the Panel have not assumed the role of an investigator, with a formalised professional framework supported by enhanced investigatory powers, in a similar manner to an Ombudsman. Instead, the Greffier forwards cases prepared by complainants to Departments and requests a summary response; government officers provide the evidence they consider relevant to the case. This means the Complaints Board, its Chair and Deputy Chair conduct investigations through opaque processes or in the form of a public hearing.

Finding 2: Although the States of Jersey Complaints Panel operates as a well- organised  complaint-handling  service,  and  the  States  Greffier  has  invested  in increasing public awareness of the service, its processes fall materially short of the standards  typically  associated  with  an  ombud  scheme.  In  consequence,  the processes have lost credibility while supporting a narrative that the main obstacle to the Panel having its recommendations accepted by Ministers is a lack of teeth.'

Different approach of PSO towards Administrative Justice

"The role of Ombudsman institutions is to protect the people against violation of rights, abuse of powers, unfair decisions and maladministration. They play an  increasingly  important  role  in  improving  public  administration  while making the government's actions more open and its administration more accountable to the public."[4]

9. A PSO, aside from formal legal remedies, constitutes a distinct mechanism of alternative dispute resolution. Although its process culminates in the issuance of recommendations, rather than legally binding determinations,5, its processes can be distinguished from those of the Complaints Panel, being characterised by an inquisitorial or investigatory approach rather than the more adversarial method of fact-finding largely by formal hearings employed by the Complaints Panel.
10. Ombud  schemes  are  now  an  established  part  of  democratic  systems,  with international  recognition,  incorporating  Venice  Commission  principles  in  their processes. They are generally recognised to have a high success rate in securing compliance with recommendations and seeking redress for citizens.
11. The practices employed by ombudsmen generally are recognised in the application of administrative justice, differing from those of the current Complaints Panel. Criminal  justice  models  separate  investigation,  evidence  presentation,  and decision making on culpability to reduce cognitive bias and prevent abuses of power and further separate the ordering of sanctions to help prevent miscarriages of justice affecting physical freedom and reputation. The Complaints Panel mirrors aspects of this approach by testing evidence through hearings that could appear to determine culpability,' functioning in a manner similar to a tribunal. However, it operates without a distinct investigative phase or formal rules on corroborating evidence.
12. Civil  justice  processes,  including  public  service  ombudsmen,  separate investigation and decision-making to a lesser extent than criminal justice models because their purpose is to deliver resolution and redress rather than to determine guilt or impose sanctions. Within ombuds schemes, it is generally acceptable for the decision-maker also to conduct the investigation, provided that the matters do not involve allegations of criminality or misconduct. Crucially, the ombudsperson must be professionally trained in investigative methodology and conscious of the need to maintain standards that can withstand scrutiny by judicial review. Ombuds processes typically place greater emphasis on efficiency and accessibility. They rely  on  transparency,  opportunities  for  parties  to  comment  and  clear  and well-reasoned decisions rather than adversarial methods.

13. The JPSO could potentially have value as an investigative resource for complaint- handling bodies outside the scope of its review.

Comparing the Complaints Panel with the PSO concept

"[T]he ombudsman's work focuses on something that is inherently difficult to measure: fairness in the way that government treats its citizens."[5]

14. A table identifying the strengths of the Complaints Panel and its weaknesses in comparison with the concept of a JPSO is set out below.

15. Government officers have expressed growing discomfort with Complaint Panel processes, as has the Law Commission. The quasi-tribunal style of hearings is adversarial, onerous, time-consuming, and disproportionately resource-intensive, with negative impacts on service delivery. There is a perception that the public- hearing  process  offers  value  as  an  outlet  for  complainants  to  express dissatisfaction (often against officers who were not directly involved in a matter), rather than a structured investigatory methodology more typically associated with formal review mechanisms. Departments may be wrongfooted by information requests during hearings for which they have not been adequately prepared, making  officers  appear  unhelpful  and  causing  unnecessary  discomfort  when representing Ministers. These processes often lead to delays beyond officers' control and may act as a barrier to achieving swift and fair resolutions.
16. Reforming the existing Complaints Panel to meet the standards of an ombud scheme  is  unlikely  to  be  either  cost-effective  or  credible  within  the  current governance framework. Focus should be on delivering an independent solution,  which meets public expectations and strengthens fairness, transparency, and trust in final-stage complaint handling.

17. The establishment of a JPSO should strengthen public trust and improve civic engagement by providing accessible, independent, and fair complaint resolution. Consistent  with  its  role,  it  would  issue  recommendations  to  prevent maladministration,[7] reduce service failures, and drive continuous improvement.
18. By modelling best international practice and promoting accountability, the JPSO would use transparent processes, encourage compliance, and foster a culture of timely resolutions. Its proactive role should, in line with the work of other PSOs, improve performance management for complaint handling across public services, ensuring higher standards and better outcomes for citizens.
19. The  risks  of  inaction  are  significant,  including  reputational  damage,  loss  of confidence in complaint processes, and ongoing resource costs. Failure to act would mean missed opportunities for service improvements and potential injustice. Establishing  a  JPSO  could  drive  real-time  performance  improvements  and complement the work of other regulatory bodies, such as the C&AG. A benefit and risk assessment weighing the options for retaining the Panel or establishing a JPSO also has been conducted (See Annex IV).

"Ombudsman Institutions have an important role to play in strengthening democracy  the  rule  of  law  good  administration  and  the  protection  and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms."[8]

20. A robust final-stage complaint handler in the form of an ombudsperson is a matter of international reputation for Jersey. This was a recommendation made as part of the Independent Care Inquiry in 2017.[9] Public service ombud schemes are now recognised  as  an  international  standard.  This  is  reflected  in  the  Venice Commission of the Council of Europe "On the Protection and Promotion of the Ombudsman Institution."[10] The OECD Public Integrity Handbook highlights ombud schemes  as  critical  pillars  of  the  oversight  architecture  that  ensure  public accountability.[11] The original Proposition P.32/2018 also reflected a significant shift in political mindset following the Independent Care Inquiry, particularly regarding what it is reasonable to expect from public services. In that context, rather than being viewed as a nice to have,' a JPSO represents a system designed to get the basics right.' Ombud schemes are a standard by which jurisdictions are to be measured by and has relevance to international scrutiny and inward investment.

Finding 3: Despite the Complaints Panel providing an organised, low-cost, complaint review mechanism, there are fundamental structural weaknesses in its framework and processes, which has undermined trust in its effectiveness.

Finding 4: The uniqueness of the Complaints Panel in its approach to the review of complaints, with its attendant flaws, makes the Complaints Panel an outlier in international best practice. A robust final-stage complaint handler in the form of an ombudsperson is a matter of international reputation for Jersey.

Finding  5:  Government  Departments  face  challenges  when  disagreeing  with recommendations  made  by  the  Complaints  Panel,  especially  where  these  fall outside of the Department's remit or are misaligned with operational objectives. This can create perceptions of adversarial dynamics and misperceptions regarding the Government's lack of compliance, and can conversely, along with concerns about the authority and credibility of the review process.

Recommendation 1: A JPSO should be established as a matter of priority to ensure that final-stage complaints are handled fairly, with optimal confidence of all parties in its processes, and to drive continuous public-service improvement. This should be supported by a duty of good administration.

Recommendation 2: The JPSO should have a bespoke legal framework with robust legal mechanisms to ensure that it acts pragmatically and proportionately while delivering best value in the use of public funds. In addition, the JPSO should:

• Act  as  a  Complaints  Standards  Authority,  setting  standards  for  complaint- handling processes across public services, while advising on structural reforms within the complaint-handling landscape.

• Have the power to initiate own-initiative' investigations where there is evidence of widespread or systemic issues. This proactive capability will maximise the JPSO's potential to deliver meaningful improvements in public-service delivery.

Final Proposals for a Complaint-Handling System

21. The following proposals below are intended to provide policy direction for the establishment of a JPSO. These will require more policy development including on separate  but  connected  policy  development  projects  for  the  next  Council  of Ministers.

Scope

22. The scope of the JPSO requires further active consideration. Policy options include extending its remit to health-related complaints, granting discretionary powers to initiate investigations based on merit, and addressing overlaps with other bodies handling final-stage complaints.
23. While a broader remit could strengthen the system, it would increase caseload and costs,  particularly  where  specialist  expertise  is  required.  The  JPSO  should complement, rather than duplicate, existing redress mechanisms and maintain a clear,  well-defined  scope  across  public  services,  including  ALOs.  It  is  not recommended that the JPSO review regulatory decisions, which should remain with specialist regulators; instead, its role should focus on service delivery or procedural failures, such as where a regulator does not follow its own processes or respond in a timely manner.
24. Health-related complaints involving clinical judgment may be better handled by professional bodies, whereas process failures could more suitably fall within the JPSO's  remit.  The  anticipated  cost  of  investigating  clinical  decisions  would significantly increase JPSO expenditure, due to the need to commission specialist clinical  experts.  While  the  Complaints  Panel  already  covers  health-related complaints, only a relatively small number currently progress to the Panel. With the improved support, accessibility, and user-friendly design of the JPSO, the volume of health complaints is expected to rise accordingly.
25. At this stage, no recommendation is being made that the JPSO should replace the Jersey Police Complaints Commission ("the JPCC") whose volunteers provide independent oversight for complaint investigations run by the SOJP and Honorary Police. New regulations were recently introduced and the JPCC is adapting its methodology  to  reflect  good  practice  in  policing:  there  could  be  a  case  for increased transparency regarding the use of these standards.
26. Concerns have been raised regarding the handling of complaints by the Law Society (a self-regulating body) regarding the conduct of lawyers sought to help with  grievances  against  public  service.  The  Jersey  Competition  Regulatory Authority has also received complaints against utility companies that are not within its jurisdiction. This indicates social benefit for the scope of the JPSO to provide independent review in such areas.
27. Deputy   Scott  recommends  that  there  remains  essential  work  for  the  States Employment  Board  ("the  SEB")  and  HR  to  undertake  in  strengthening  the governance  of  conduct-related  complaints,  and  accessibility  of  lodging  such complaints.  It  is  recommended  that  a  clear  responsibility  should  be  held  for monitoring staff conduct complaints to ensure that they are handled consistently, and to report outcomes to support organisational learning and accountability. Further clarity is also required to help the public distinguish between conduct and service-related complaints across public service providers, alongside clear routes for reporting and expected handling processes.

28. The Comité des Connétable s has formally opposed the inclusion of parishes within a proposed JPSO scheme. Deputy Scott advises constructive engagement with the Comité to fully understand and address its concerns. There is no clear rationale for why the 1982 Law has not already been extended to the Parishes, given the issues identified in this Report. Views of the Comité regarding this lack of extension have not been sought. The Comité developed its own complaints system during Deputy Scott 's review. Deputy Scott is of the view that a JPSO would be a preferable reviewer of complaints against Parishes than a continuation of the Panel for such complaints.

Recommendation 3: The JPSO should be established with a broad jurisdiction to replace the existing Complaints Panel.

Recommendation 4: Further policy development work is required to define an appropriate scope for the JPSO, one that achieves comprehensive coverage, avoids duplication, and delivers an effective and efficient complaint-handling framework.

Recommendation 5: Subsidiary work should be commenced to rationalise and simplify complaint-handling policies and processes across Government and ALOs alongside the establishment of the JPSO. This will improve triaging and signposting for public-service complaints, ensuring a clearer and more efficient complaints handling landscape.

User friendliness

29. The public consultation showed a clear preference for a confidential, inquisitorial approach  rather  than  a  tribunal-style  process,  strongly  supporting  the establishment  of a  JPSO.  Reflecting  this  feedback,  the  final-stage  complaint reviewer should have proven experience in investigative processes and outcome- based resolution, as well as a strong understanding of Data Protection Law, particularly regarding the publication of complaint findings.
30. Additional policy development work is recommended to make the complaints landscape easier to navigate, ensuring clarity on where complaints should be directed and which authority is responsible. Establishing defined remits, simple processes, and clear communications will help prevent the JPSO from spending excessive resources filtering complaints outside its remit. This preparation will reduce  workloads  and  improve  accessibility,  tackling  perceptions  that  public services are unreachable and ensuring clarity on which complaints fall within the JPSO's scope.

Transparency and privacy

31. While the Panel provides a visible platform for citizens to express concerns about how government handles complaints, the general purpose of tribunals is to expose flaws in their own processes. However, the only redress for government officers or members of the public in respect of such flaws is in the form of a costly judicial review hearing.
32. The use of public hearings to investigate complaints was not supported in a public consultation  conducted  as  part  of  this  work  and  can  deter  individuals  from escalating complaints while risking disclosure of personal details. Organisational challenges  in  arranging  formal  hearings  attended  by  all  interested  parties, adequately prepared, plus time constraints on the length of hearings, create barriers to robust investigation.

Keeping Operational costs low (including use of existing infrastructure)

33. The  2020  Government  Plan  allocated  recurring  funding,  including  pay-award inflation, to support the establishment and ongoing operation of a JPSO.[12] This allocation of £398k is intended to cover set-up and running costs. The existing Complaints Panel costs around £100k per year, including casework administrative support provided by Scrutiny Officers.
34. Indicative operational models for the JPSO have been assessed and costed in the accompanying  costbenefit  analysis  (Annex  IV).  These  estimates  exclude secondary impacts, such as the costs of managing complaints or implementing recommendations, due to a lack of sufficient data for detailed modelling.
35. While the JPSO could be established within the existing budget, additional funding may be required if its remit is extended to cover all public-service complaints, particularly health-related matters. To prevent this, further consideration of cost- management and improved efficiency is recommended.
36. While cost control is important, retaining an ineffective and mistrusted system will ultimately cost more, financially and in service quality, than establishing a JPSO. To  optimise  value  and  adhere  to  public  spending  constraints,   Deputy   Scott recommends leveraging resource-sharing opportunities within Jersey's regulatory environment  and  implementing  an  appropriately-sized  model  for  the  JPSO, alongside further modelling to determine how it can integrate with other ALOs and the regulatory landscape to avoid duplication and maximise effectiveness.
37. Updating the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982 ("the 1982"), which currently constitutes the Complaints Panel, would involve significant cost compared to amending the existing draft legislation for establishing a JPSO. Extensive  work  has  already  been  undertaken  on  draft  legislation  for  an independent JPSO, which could be leveraged to reduce legislative development costs. Introducing a new, modern, fit-for-purpose legislative framework would provide robust support for the operation and governance of the JPSO. In contrast, amending the 1982 Law would require policy development to begin almost afresh, resulting in higher costs and delivering a less impactful outcome.

38. Deputy Scott considers that cost management should include implementing other recommendations, such as rationalising of appeals against regulatory decisions and Ministers instructing publicly funded bodies through service level agreements to  improve  transparency  and  quality  of  complaint-handling  processes  in preparation of the establishment of a JPSO.
39. For costeffectiveness, the convoluted complaints landscape must be streamlined to support the work of a future JPSO. The current system is overly complex, with siloed approaches among ALOs and unclear escalation routes for finalstage complaints,  creating  confusion  and  inefficiencies.  Wider  reform  of  the complaintshandling landscape is therefore needed alongside the establishment of the  JPSO.  Clearer  pathways  are  required,  particularly  for  appeals  against regulatory decisions and for defining how the JPSO will interface with regulators. While  the  JPSO  would  not  review  regulatory  decisions,  it  could  consider servicedelivery  or  procedural  failures  within  regulatory  bodies.  Aligning  and simplifying processes will improve navigation and reduce overlap or perceived conflicts of interest.
40. The use of volunteers within the JPSO framework, as with the existing Complaints Panel, should be considered to improve citizen engagement, enhance service quality, and help improve cost effectiveness.
41. The JPSO could strengthen trust of the Jersey Financial Services Commission and other regulatory authorities by offering independent redress where complaints relate to delivery of services rather than regulatory decisions (which are more appropriate for an appeals tribunal) and, possibly, given the blurred lines between service and conduct, offer independent investigation where matters of conduct have resulted in a failure of service, such as lack of adherence to standard procedures. As the Channel Island Financial Ombudsman ("the CIFO") conducts specialist investigations funded by private businesses, the sharing of resources would not be appropriate. The concept of the 'polluter pays' principle associated with  the  Channel  Island  Financial  Ombudsman  and  the  Jersey  Competition Regulatory Authority ("the JCRA") could have merit in funding the JPSO and encouraging improved complaint-handling practice across public services. Options to share some or all costs for a PSO with Guernsey might also be explored in the further.

Finding 6: The existing operational budget is unlikely to be sufficient to establish a fully operational JPSO without further consideration of cost containment.

Finding  7:  While  cost  containment  is  appropriate,  the  greater  long-term unquantifiable cost lies in retaining a weak system that has lost government officer and public trust and losing an opportunity to enhance redress for citizens, improve trust in Government, and drive genuine service improvements in accordance with international standards.

Finding 8: The costs of a JPSO would be broadly comparable to fully reforming the existing Complaints Panel to perform the functions of an ombud scheme, but with the  added  benefits  of  enhanced  independence,  professional  casework  and investigatory staff, ensuring consistency and quality and improved public trust.

Recommendation 6: The JPSO in its role as the Complaint Standards Authority should lead a coordinated effort to ensure every service provider publishes clear and accessible Codes of Conduct, Service Standards, and complaint

handling information.

Recommendation 7: That States Members be provided with complaints handling training by the Greffe to assist with orderly direction, logging and co-ordination of complaints and to support States Members in focusing on policy work.  

Recommendation 8: Further work is required to consider cost containment and ongoing budget to develop a size-appropriate JPSO while ensuring best value for money.

Recommendation 9: In order to help support the public in highlighting concerns regarding ethical conduct, policy officers should investigate the Employment Law implications of including provision that the JPSO, in consultation with the States Employment Board (SEB), should develop a code of ethical standards for public sector employees and be authorised:

• to determine whether there has been non-compliance with that code by employees of the SEB; and

• to inform complainants and the SEB of a determination of breach.

Such a determination should be taken into account by the SEB when considering complaints and any disciplinary matters. Consideration should also be given to extending  the  code  of  ethical  standards  and  authorisation  to  complaints  of employees of other public services and to inform their employers accordingly.

Precision of jurisdiction including governance framework and enforcement powers

42. The current Complaints Panel is widely regarded as lacking real authority or teeth,' functioning as a quasi-tribunal without enforceable powers and prompting  questions about its independence. Its dependence on the States Greffe further blurs this position, and any expansion of its remit into areas such as parish matters risks amplifying constitutional and conflict-of-interest concerns.

43. The JPSO's independent statutory footing is expected to give greater weight to its recommendations. Rather than being viewed as aligned with government, it will be recognised  as  an  impartial  watchdog  whose  assessments  are  grounded  in objectivity and fairness. Its emphasis on constructive engagement will support proportionate,  practical  recommendations  developed  through  dialogue  with services where appropriate. Where cooperation is not forthcoming, the JPSO will have recourse to formal mechanisms, including the ability to lay reports before the States Assembly to draw attention to unresolved concerns.
44. To  engender  trust  in  JPSO's  judgment  and  processes,  it  should  have  an acceptable degree of independence from the public services it investigates. An independent structure as an ALO is appropriate to achieve this. However, this needs to be balanced against growing pressures to curb the unsustainable growth of ALOs and public sector spending. Further work is required to ensure that the JPSO is afforded the right degree of independence, while maximising value for money.  
45. The JPSO should be overseen by an independent governance board (possibly partly or wholly staffed by volunteers), which could be shared with other ALOs or regulatory bodies to promote cost-saving and prevent siloed thinking. Deputy Scott has considered the potential opportunities for the C&AG and the PAC to work closely with, or have oversight over, aspects of the JPSO work which would resolve current  conflict  issues  and  support  independence  from  government  while strengthening accountability. This might include the JPSO providing Reports to the PAC, as part of governance arrangements to ensure that States Members can have a role in supervision, or short-term arrangements during the establishment period to harness the C&AG's experience in governance and cost control.

Finding 9: An ombud scheme model, whereby the reviewer acts as an impartial watchdog rather than a regulator, aligns better with constitutional separation of political, administrative, and judicial roles and accountability and is more likely to achieve compliance with recommendations via its outcome focussed approach.

Finding 10: Consideration could be given to a PSO acting as an independent resource for other statutory bodies performing regulatory appeal or review roles to streamline expenses and provide assurance of independence of administrative justice functions.

Finding 11: There is a lack of clarity and consistency regarding the routes for review or appeals in several areas, including from regulatory decisions, and how the proposed JPSO will interface with regulatory bodies regarding service complaints.  The lines between complaints of professional conduct and maladministration also can be blurred.

Finding 12: Research shows that, with a PSO in place, administrative processes become more streamlined, and organisational silos and inconsistencies reduced. The ombudsperson's role is widely respected for providing fair and constructive recommendations, which is reflected in the high proportion of recommendations that are accepted and implemented.

Recommendation  10:  The  JPSO  should  have  enhanced  independence  and governance arrangements. Further consideration should be given to:

• The appropriate framework for governance, including sharing a governance board with other regulatory bodies.

• Achieving financial and political accountability through statutory PAC/C&AG relationships.

Conclusion and Next Steps

46. Establishing an independent JPSO is essential to restoring trust, ensuring fairness, and  improving  complaint  handling  across  public  services.  It  will  standardise processes,  promote  transparency,  and  drive  service  improvements  within  a costefficient framework, while failure to act risks continued inefficiencies and reputational harm. Its effectiveness, however, depends on wider work to improve consistency and coordination of complaints and appeals across public bodies. This includes developing clear Codes of Conduct and complaintshandling procedures and providing appropriate training or signposting for States Members to support effective and efficient navigation of complaints pathways.
47. While based on sound public interest considerations, certain details of Proposition P.32/2018 need to be refined in light of changing public dynamics, including public service cost profiles, and concerns regarding certain regulators voiced in the media. These refinements should be shaped by the further policy work advised in this Report.

Recommendation 11: A roadmap for implementation of a JPSO, including a refined Proposition to update P.32/2018, should be developed for submission to the next Council of Ministers at the start of the new political term following the election in June 2026.

ANNEX I Terms of Reference: Public Services Ombudsperson Project

1. Introduction

In  March  2018,  the  States  Assembly  approved  the  proposition  Public  Services Ombudsman: Establishment of Office (P.32/2018),' agreeing in principle that a Public Services Ombudsman should be established. This followed recommendations made by the 2000 Clothier Review, the Jersey Law Commission 2017 report on Jersey's administrative justice system, and the Independent Jersey Care Inquiry's follow up review of 2019. This was also welcomed by the former Comptroller and Auditor General in her report, Governance – A Thinkpiece,' published in December 2019.

Development of legislation to establish a Jersey Public Services Ombudsperson ("the JPSO")  first  commenced  in  2018.  Successive  governments  have  committed  to continue  the  project.  This  included  allocation  of  funding  to  establish  the Ombudsperson in the 2021 Government Plan. The project has yet to be concluded.

Jersey  has  an  existing  complaint-handling  mechanism,  the  States  of  Jersey Complaints Panel, established under the Administrative Decisions (Review) (Jersey) Law 1982, which is currently restricted to the hearing of complaints by those who are "aggrieved by any decision made, or any act done or omitted, relating to any matter of administration by any Minister or Department of the States or by any person acting on behalf of any such Minister or Department." P.32/2018 contemplated replacement of the Panel with the JPSO.

To date, government work has focused on establishing a new complaint-handling body in the form of a JPSO and, prior to 2024, steps had not been taken either to develop or expand the scope of the existing Complaints Panel or to consider how new complaint-handling arrangements might work in conjunction with the Panel.

The Law Commission's 2024 report Keeping the Complaints Panel or creating the Ombudsperson' highlighted matters for consideration by the government should it wish to continue with the Panel in any way. This is necessary to ensure that comprehensive research has been conducted – as demanded by the States decision in P.32/2018 – to ensure an Ombudsperson scheme may be implemented economically, effectively, and efficiently.

2. Purpose

The Chief Minister has commissioned the Assistant Minister for Sustainable Economic Development, Deputy Moz Scott , to lead the next phase of the project to deliver a final- stage complaint-handling mechanism or combination of mechanisms.

3. Scope

The project will identify, blend and, where considered in the Jersey public interest, improve upon the best elements of the Complaints Panel and the concept of a Public  Services Ombudsperson and must lead to the development of final proposals for a complaint-handling system that:

1. provides recourse for individuals with complaints against a range of public bodies and not only government departments;
2. is accessible and user-friendly;
3. provides a non-adversarial mechanism for complaints resolution and enables resolution of complaints informally where appropriate;
4. promotes transparency while respecting the potential desire for privacy on the part of complainants;
5. considers the use of existing infrastructure and expertise to keep operational costs low; and
6. has a precise jurisdiction that does not impinge on the jurisdiction of the courts or recourse through existing bodies.

4. Timing

Final proposals will be presented to the Chief Minister by July 2025.

5. Governance

The Assistant Minister for Sustainable Economic Development will lead the project on behalf of the Chief Minister.

The strategic direction for the project is set out by the Chief Minister in these terms of reference. The Assistant Minister will develop proposals that satisfy the conditions set out in section 3, above.

These proposals will be presented to the Chief Minister for consideration, and then to the Council of Ministers and thereafter, to the Assembly for any necessary decisions including with reference to the decision taken in P32.2018.

The project will be supported by the Governance and Communities Policy Team in the Cabinet Office.

The project will work closely with key stakeholders, including the Complaints Panel and complaint handlers across public bodies. Other groups will be engaged to provide expertise, including the Jersey Law Commission, the Ombudsman Association, the Channel  Islands  Financial  Ombudsman,  and  public  service  ombud  schemes  in comparable jurisdictions.

ANNEX II – Research Methodology

1. From October 2024, the Assistant Minister for Sustainable Economic Development

and External Relations, Deputy Moz Scott , led a program of work to understand local needs and decide whether there was merit in introducing a JPSO. This included:

a) Mapping out Jersey's local redress system to assist in a high-level gap analysis. .

b) Considering the work already undertaken by the Jersey Care Inquiry,[13] the Jersey Law Commission,[14] the Comptroller and Auditor General,[15] and the Public Accounts Committee's most recent review into Handling and Learning from Customer Complaints.[16] The Assistant Minister was not privy to any private testimonials on which the findings of these reports were based and made separate investigations to inform her own findings, as itemised below.

c) Researching final-stage complaint mechanisms in other jurisdictions similar to Jersey, including:

• Bermuda;

• Cayman Islands;

• England;

• Gibraltar;

• Ireland;

• Isle of Man;

• Scotland; and

• Wales.

d) "Feedback On Public Services" public consultation (10 March - 6 May 2025) to gather feedback on experiences with public-service complaints processes and views on how an independent complaint reviewer should operate in Jersey.[17]

e) Engagement with:

• Bailiff ;

• Channel Islands Financial Services Ombudsman;

• Citizens Advice Bureau:

• Complaints Panel;

• Corporate Services Scrutiny Panel;

• Greffier;

• Information Commissioner;

• Jersey Care Commission;

• Jersey Financial Services Commission;

• Law Commission;

• Minister for Housing (on the subject of Tribunals);

• Ombudsman Association;

• States Members (including the Deputy Chief Minister);

• States of Jersey Police Complaints Authority; and

• people who have experience with the current Complaints Panel's public hearing process (both members of the public and officers).

6. Personal attendance at a hearing of the States of Jersey Complaints Board.
7. A desk-based review of relevant reports and academic literature relating to public service ombud schemes.
8. A cost-benefit and financial analysis to establish indicative operational costs for policy options.
9. A response from the States Greffier, copied to the Council of Ministers and members of the PPC, was received on 11 March 2026 and has been taken into account.

ANNEX III – Detailed Findings

Overarching Final-Stage Complaint-handling System

1. Deputy Scott 's findings indicate that there are positive intentions, a strong public- service commitment, and a clear desire to ensure fair hearings among those involved in the current complaint handling and review mechanisms, as well as their administration.
2. Deputy   Scott  identifies  significant  shortcomings  in  legislation,  governance, processes, record-keeping, communication, and the absence of a holistic approach among complaints reviewers. These deficiencies, together with weaknesses in the pathways for reviewing complaints, present substantial challenges that:

1. erode trust and confidence in public services and complaint-handling;
2. generate emotional stress for complainants and government officers;
3. introduce  burdensome  and  inefficient  complaint-handling  processes  which impact productivity within the public sector; and
4. create  barriers  to  effective  complaint  resolution,  leading  to  adversarial, protracted complaints processes where both complainants and government officers may perceive the system as unfair.

3. Complaint  pathways  are  often  unclear,  causing  some  individuals  to  pursue concerns through multiple channels. This leads to frustration, duplicated effort, and increased  resource  costs  for  Government.  Fragmented  handling  across departments  and  representatives  reduces  efficiency  and  productivity.  Clearer pathways and stronger coordination between complaint handlers are needed. Establishing the JPSO should help reduce follow-up costs and repeated contacts across the system.
4. Insufficient triage by complaints reviewers means the responsibility for interpreting complaints, and the associated resource costs, falls on Government departments. Key details, such as the grounds of complaint, desired outcome, agreed facts and agreed points of contention, are often not pre-determined or are missing, leading to additional time and resource burdens in preparing responses and case hearings.
5. Some  final-stage  complaint  handlers  lack  clear  structural  separation  of  roles, creating perceptions of limited independence. When a single authority undertakes multiple functions, such as regulation, investigation, and enforcement, without adequate safeguards, it can lead to concerns about impartiality and trust. For example,  the  Jersey  Data  Protection  Authority  ("the  JDPA")  and  the  Jersey Financial Services Commission ("the JFSC") face criticism for perceived conflicts of interest, undermining trust in their impartiality. The Data Protection Tribunal was replaced by the JDPA in 2018, Deputy Scott considers that this has deprived complainants  against  data  protection  regulatory  decisions  from  one  form  of independent review. More recently, there have been calls for the JFSC to have its own regulatory appeals board. This indicates a need for, or a desirability, to have an alignment of routes for appeal against regulatory decisions, which will need to be clearly distinguished from the role of an ombud scheme.

6. There  are  opportunities  for  collaboration,  particularly  during  the  roll-out  and establishment of the JPSO, to support States Members in managing complaints and  engaging  effectively  with  the  new  system.  The  JPSO,  as  a  Complaint Standards Authority, has the potential to provide independent investigative support to other bodies, such as the office of the Commissioner for Standards. With respect to the office of Commissioner for Standards, Deputy Scott considers the role to be fundamentally different from that of the JPSO and should remain separate. Unlike the JPSO, the office of the Commissioner for Standards is reasonably expected to publish personal details of persons investigated to ensure political accountability. However, similar to a court, the decisions of the Commissioner for Standards can impact on personal reputations, indicating that administrative justice could be better served by separating the Commissioner's professional roles of investigating a complaint  from  the  role  of  evaluating  the  findings  of  an  investigation  and recommending  an  appropriate  response  to  the  Privileges  and  Procedures Committee ("the PPC").
7. During the course of research, concerns were raised regarding the manner of publication by the PPC of reports of two complaints review bodies the Complaints Panel and the Commissioner for Standards with respect to perceived imbalance between observing a principle of transparency and the observation of modern standards of privacy rights: these concerns have been passed onto the Chair, the Greffier and members of the PPC by Deputy Scott for consideration.
8. Although those involved in the Complaints Panel agree that hearings should be fair, inconsistencies in their processes, scope creep, a possible David vs Goliath' narrative (and attendant publicity) and limitations on providing a full hearing in which all points raised can be answered as they arise, have led Government officers to perceive  the  Complaints  Panel  platform  and  system  as  biased  in  favour  of complainants from the outset. This perception has, in turn, reduced officers' trust in the process. Complaint investigations are frequently  heard as isolated cases, without systematic review of wider public service contexts, using inconsistent and unclear processes. This lack of transparency undermines the principle of fair hearings.
   9. There is a cultural difference of complainants approaching States Members for support. The public consultation identified that 51% of respondents used States Members as a way of pursing complaints. Anecdotally, States Members often find officers already are aware of such complaints and approaches to officers regarding the same complaint occur (which potentially can be duplicated by the current number  of  States  Members).  The  public  consultation has also  identified  this method of complaint reporting (or complaint handling dissatisfaction reporting) does not necessarily produce a resolution to the satisfaction of the complainant. As one commentator put it, A Deputy can only hold your hand so far.'
9. The  2025  public  consultation  found  that  86%  of  respondents,  who  used  an alternative route to escalate their complaint, were not satisfied with the quality of the  method  used  to  review  their  complaint.[18]  Establishing  an  independent

ombudsperson, with the function of a Complaint Standards Authority, to direct, collect, and log final-stage complaints across all public services, including arm's- length organisations ("ALOs"), would improve clarity and strengthen oversight across public services.

11. Citizens Advice Jersey is a valuable existing resource in supporting citizens through the complaints process. This may be particularly helpful for complainants who need to navigate multiple options for having a final-stage complaint heard and understand the jurisdiction of different avenues, such as Tribunals or Judicial Review. This should be more widely advertised within the public sector. Citizens Advice will be better supported in delivering its services by a clearer complaints landscape, including mapping in this area.

Scope of review of the Complaints Panel

12. To help support the establishment of the JPSO, Deputy Scott recommends that wider reform of the complaint-handling landscape should be pursued under a distinct  Terms  of  Reference,  with  dedicated  budget,  further  stakeholder engagement, and targeted research. Given the scope and complexity of these additional matters, it is advised that this could be in the form of one or more projects in the next political cycle to ensure adequate time and resources. This should include work to improve the distinction between regulatory and service complaints and also complaints concerning staff conduct, which should fall under disciplinary procedures.
13. The  Complaints  Panel's  limited  jurisdiction,  combined  with  the  absence  of independent appeals bodies for certain regulatory authorities and the lack of an ombudsperson for service standards, means that judicial review is currently the only option for resolving complaints against many public-service providers outside Government,  such  as  Jersey  Water,  Andium  Homes,  Jersey  Electricity,  and parishes. This reliance on judicial review creates a significant barrier to justice because of the high cost of legal representation, resulting in an inequitable system for those seeking redress.
14. Other  nonMinisterial  departments  face  challenges  in  ensuring  independence within  existing  final-stage  complainthandling  processes.  For  example,  when complaints involve the States Greffe (the current administrator of the Complaints Panel), the current legal solution of having the Complaints Panel review the complaint is unsatisfactory because the States Greffe also administers the Panel, creating a conflict of interest. Likewise, the PPC which publishes Reports of the Complaints  Panel,  to  whom  members  of  the  public  might  seek  recourse  if dissatisfied with operations of the Complaint Panel (e.g. content in the Complaints Panel's  annual  report)  is  supported  by  States  Greffe  officers,  raising  similar concerns. Deputy Scott highlights, one member of the public has complained about an omission in the Panel's Report which was not supported by the PPC (which is administered by the Greffier as is the Panel): the conflict therefore affects trust. Concerns regarding similar circularity, and an optical lack of independence have been  raised  for  complaints  concerning  Jersey  Office  of  the  Information Commissioner ("the JOIC") and the JDPA.

15. There is no recourse to an independent body for complaints regarding service standards of the JDPA, JFSC, Jersey Competition Regulatory Authority ("the JCRA"),  Jersey  Care  Commission  ("the  JCC"),  Charity  Commissioner, Commissioner for Standards, and the Jersey Electoral Authority ("the JEA"). To assist in independent complaint resolution, support consistency in investigation methodology,  and  streamline  costs,  consideration  of  the  JPSO  carrying  out investigations and possible mediation on behalf of the JDPA, JFSC, JCRA, JCC and other bodies (there currently is no mediation process regarding complaints made against States Members) including the JEA should be considered by relevant Ministers and the PPC.[19]
16. To reduce the cost of referrals, and build upon government efforts to resolve complaints before recourse to judicial review, as well as remedying areas where judicial review is the only recourse available to a complainant, Deputy Scott recommends that:

1. perceived and actual flaws in governance structures should be identified. This might include access to the JDPA and logging of complaints by Jersey Police Complaints Commission ("the JPCC") other than through bodies overseen by them, and inviting ALOs to implement best-practice internal complaint-handling procedures by reference to the work of the Comptroller and Auditor General ("the C&AG") and publications on complaints handling issued by other agencies e.g. Jersey Cyber Security Centre and Gambling Commission; and
2. the following should be considered:

• separate  investigative  and  determination  bodies  to  support  regulatory functions and complaint reviewing, using existing resources and budgets, such as those of the JFSC, JOIC / JDPA, JCRA, JCC, and States Greffe (the Commissioner for Standards);

• a tribunal route for appeals from the JFSC, JOIC / JDPA, JCRA, and JCC's regulatory decisions with the support of existing budgets, such as those of the  Tribunal  Service,  JFSC,  JDPA,  JCRA,  JCC,  and  Children's Commissioner; and

• that funds should be levied on a polluter pays' basis i.e. where fault is found, the relevant public authority should pay the investigation costs.

States of Jersey Complaints Panel

17. In  order  for  findings  of  the  Complaints  Panel  to  be  regarded  as  sound  and reasonable by Ministers and government officers, in the same way as a formal tribunal administered by the court service might be, it is important that the Panel acts impartially and that its authority be constitutionally recognised. The 1982 Law has created obstacles in this respect, which have affected the operations of the Panel and, despite the positive intentions of its members, the credibility of some of its decisions (explained below).

18. The 1982 Law sets out the following as grounds for the Panel requesting that a Minister, Department, or person reconsider a decision, act or omission that is the subject matter of the complaint –
    1. contrary to law;
    2. unjust,  oppressive  or  improperly  discriminatory,  or  in  accordance  with  a provision of any enactment or practice which is or might be unjust, oppressive or improperly discriminatory;
    3. based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact;
    4. could not have been made by a reasonable body of persons after proper consideration of all the facts; or
    5. contrary to the generally accepted principles of natural justice.
    20. On occasion, a matter complained of has related to the content of a law or policy that has been properly applied by government officers, having taken appropriate advice. Government officers do not create policy or law. Often complainants in public hearings are vocal in criticising government officers who have done their jobs, when the more normal way of seeking policy or legal change is through the political process. While it could be helpful for complainants to be alerted to this or for the nature of desired law or policy changes to be pinpointed, this does not require a public hearing, particularly where the rationale for those hearings (see below) is that the publicity should force Ministers to settle, when States Members can and do advocate for such changes if approached for such purposes.
19. Following a meeting with Deputy Scott , the Attorney General offered legal support services to the Complaints Panel to address a conflict within the Law Officers' Department regarding the provision of legal advice to Government officers. This support was requested to mitigate concerns that the Complaints Panel was straying into the jurisdiction of the courts by giving opinions on points of law.
20. Constitutionally, law and its interpretation is a matter to be determined by the courts, and even a tribunal in the court system does not determine matters of law, rather it seeks to apply it. The legal advice obtained by government advisers has not always aligned with the views of Panel members on whether a decision, act or omission conforms with law. By expressing its opinion on what the law is, rather than noting legal matters should be determined in a more appropriate forum (the courts or by change of the law where unclear), the Panel has left government officers unfairly exposed to criticism.
    19. The  1982  Law  does  not  specifically  require  complaint  investigations  to  be conducted primarily through public hearings. The "Scrutiny Panel style" format has been  an  administrative  choice  that  has  been  preferred  by  members  of  the Complaints Panel. This process for the investigation and resolution of complaints is unique to Jersey. It is not a widely recognisable format, which may cause confusion for complainants, or attendees at such public hearings. It falls materially short of international standards for investigations, complaint resolution, and the protection of individuals' privacy rights, which are intended to support the balanced assessment of complaints.

23. The 1982 Law requires the States Greffier with the least possible delay' to enquire into the facts of the matter' and present a report on that enquiry to the Chairs or one of the Deputy Chairs of the Panel. This could be interpreted as requiring the States Greffier to act as an investigator in determining fact, in the manner of a court officer, despite the States Greffier role primarily being to perform the duties of a clerk to a legislative body, rather than requiring a professional investigative background.
24. No methodology for the evaluation of evidence has been produced by the States Greffe or the Panel as a quasi-tribunal' nor are:

1. agreed statements of fact;
2. triaging of complaints; or
3. a statement of grounds of complaint that shows a clear connection between each specific action/decision complained of and the justifications for complaint list in Article 9(2) of the 1982 Law

a standard part of the process for Panel hearings. This contributes to government officers' concerns regarding consistency in the quality of Panel findings.

25. The Panel's quasi-judicial approach towards complaint-resolution processes:

1. lack transparency, including on how complaints will be assessed and the evidence will be evaluated;
2. require a more structured format for case and evidence presentation and fact finding, while causing confusion owing to a superficial resemblance to Scrutiny Panel hearings;
3. have insufficient investigative resourcing that might reasonably be expected to support a fair hearing in accordance with international standards; and
4. lack focus on outcome-based complaint resolution, leading to an adversarial approach.
   26. Deputy Scott notes that public hearings introduce an element of "spectacle" that can  feel  uncomfortable  in  a  small  community  and  may  deter  participation. Feedback indicates that the hearing-led process discourages complaints, reduces engagement, and lowers compliance with recommendations. Unlike a professional investigatory model focused on evidence-based fact finding, the current approach prioritises personal narrative. Consultation responses show strong support for confidential,  investigative  processes  that  protect  anonymity  and  emphasise resolution and service improvement.

28. Public hearings can be intimidating, inaccessible, and burdensome, particularly for complainants with specific needs. Many do not seek public exposure and view hearings as a barrier. Preparing for hearings can be stressful and time-consuming, requiring time off work and extensive paperwork. Stress may affect attendance by Ministers or officers, which the Panel can interpret as disrespectful. Deputy Scott notes that comparable bodies, such as the JPCC, use an oversight framework aligned with best practice in UK policing and are strengthening their procedures to support the new regulations which took effect in December 25.The Chair of the JPCC has expressed a willingness for its decisions to be appealed to a third party  such as JPSO as an alternative to judicial review subject to a States Assembly decision in the establishment of such an office.

28. Departments must devote significant time and resources to prepare for hearings, often compounded by unexpected information requests during proceedings. This creates inefficiencies, discomfort for officers, and inconsistent opportunities to respond or correct inaccuracies, contributing to perceptions of unfairness.
29. Despite the concerns outlined above, the current Complaints Panel has several valuable and transferable strengths that should be retained and incorporated into the JPSO model within a modernised investigatory framework. In particular, the contribution  of  volunteers  is  widely  recognised  as  an  important  source  of independent oversight and impartiality. This is a valued form of civil engagement which contributes to the Panel's low operational cost. This element of commitment to public service and value for money should be recognised and carried forwards.
30. Regardless of the format, the following underlying aims of the Panel are to:

1. provide an official forum for citizens to express frustration with Government complainthandling processes;
2. reassure complainants that an independent body has validated their complaint where it is upheld;
3. use the possibility of public scrutiny to encourage public services to resolve complaints; and
4. highlight actual  or  perceived  shortcomings  in  public  service processes or conduct.

These core aims should be embedded within the ombuds scheme to ensure that citizens have fair access to redress and that the system retains sufficient authority and influence to prompt Government to settle complaints appropriately.

Key Differences: Ombudsperson and Complaints Panel

31. The  Complaints  Panel  falls  short  of  suggested  best-practice  standards  for ombudsperson schemes. In contrast, a JPSO would operate under a substantially different framework and operational model, designed to meet modern expectations and deliver a more effective, customer-focused service.
32. Research  from  Queen  Margaret  University  Edinburgh  in  2013  observed  that consumer expectations would be the drivers of change for the future of successful ombud schemes.[20] The report identified eight ways schemes might need to shift practices to respond to challenges, by becoming:

1. informal in terms of process;
2. timely in the resolution of complaints;
3. focused on oral/interactive communication with consumers;
4. available to consumers online;

5. visible and accessible to consumers;
6. proactive and influential in the policy environment;
7. strategic in influencing service provision; and
8. integrated rather than sectoral.

33. Figure 1 shows the low number of complaints received by the Panel. This is primarily due to:

1. limited coverage of the Panel to Ministerial Departments;
2. lack of public profile; and
3. barriers in terms of process, such as accessibility and public hearings.

34. Importantly, there is no evidence that this low number of complaints is due to a lack of overall public-service complaints. Figures published by the Government show a proportionate number of complaints handled through internal processes.[21] The current system, with its significant barriers, leaves many people silent because they feel that it is too hard to navigate or lack confidence in the process.
35. The improved visibility and accessibility of a new ombudsperson is estimated to increase  the  caseload  for  final-stage  complaints,  with  ongoing  increases  in subsequent years. Based on trends in similar jurisdictions, the JPSO could receive 150–200 complaints annually. Other ombud schemes have observed a year-on- year increase in complaints. In Jersey, this trend is indicated in the increase in internal Government complaints reaching Stage 3; 9 in 2023, 20 in 2024, and 63 in 2025.[22] It is expected that the JPSO caseload will follow a similar trajectory as shown by jurisdictions in Table 1.

26 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0

2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024

New Complaints Informal Enquiries

Figure 1: Complaints Received by States of Jersey Complaints Panel Table 1: Public Service Ombud Scheme Complaint Levels

36. There are significant differences between the proposed operating model for the JPSO and the existing Complaints Panel (see Table 3). These include:

1. an independent body rather than one embedded within the legislative structure;
2. a wider scope of coverage, including appropriate ALOs;
3. an inquisitorial / investigatory approach rather than an adversarial / adjudicative one;
4. use of professional complaint handlers;
5. greater public profile and accessibility and a stronger user-focused design; and
6. use of a recognised professional framework for conducting investigations.

Table 3: Key differences between Complaints Panel and Ombudsperson

37. The Panel is staffed by volunteers who prefer the hearing-based model. Reforming it to operate like a professional ombudsperson would place unfair pressure on volunteers. No other complaint-handling mechanism in the British Isles conducts investigations in this way. The current model is a legacy of the former committee structure of the States Assembly, yet it cannot be considered culturally significant as it has no long-standing historic basis. Consideration was given to establishing a tribunal; however, the public consultation did not support this approach. Instead, adopting a clean slate' model, clearly separating the new system from existing structures both in practice and perception, would be more effective.

Prior Support and Mandate for an Ombud scheme

38. A substantial body of prior research and public consultation strongly supports the establishment of a JPSO. The evidence strongly suggests that a JPSO would drive service improvements and deliver fairer outcomes for complainants, regardless of projected operational costs or anticipated savings.
39. The establishment of a JPSO has been supported and advocated by:

1. The 2018 States Assembly's decision, with only eight members voting contre;[26]

2. Successive Budget amendments lodged by the Corporate Services Scrutiny Panel and adopted by the States Assembly;[27]
3. The Clothier Report (2000);
4. The Independent Jersey Care Inquiry (2017); and
5. The Jersey Law Commission, which undertook an extensive research project and published a report in 2018.

40. Two public consultations, held in 2019 and 2025 respectively, have revealed strong support for improving current final-stage complaint mechanisms. In the 2019 consultation, only 7 of 69 written responses opposed the establishment of a JPSO. Opposition, came from the existing Complaints Panel, the PPC, the Comité des Connétable s, and four members of the public.[28] The consultation overseen by Deputy Scott confirmed that, despite recent improvements, significant gaps remain especially regarding final-stage complaint handling and indicate a clear preference for a confidential and inquisitorial approach to complaint resolution.

Civic Engagement and Trust

"Ombudsman institutions (OIs) act as the guardians of citizens' rights and as a mediator between citizens and the public administration. While the very existence of such institutions is rooted in the notion of open government

the  role  they  can  play  in  promoting  openness  throughout  the  public administration has not been adequately recognized or exploited."[29]

41. The  best-performing  organisations  treat  complaints  as  valuable  feedback  to improve service standards and to create a culture of learning and improvement.[30] Many complaints are raised for altruistic reasons, reflecting citizens' desire to prevent similar issues for others. Complaints should be seen as constructive feedback that supports service improvement. Bearing in mind Jersey's relatively poor voter engagement, the potential for increased civic engagement related to increased satisfaction with complaint handling across the public services spectrum should be encouraged. The percentage of registered voters who voted (41.6%) was lower than in all OECD member and partner countries, who have an average voter turnout rate of 70%.[31] However, the JOLS opinion survey suggests that Government Departments saw a strong increase in public trust between 2022-25.[32] Establishing a JPSO may help build on this positive trajectory strengthening public- service trust and, in turn, enhancing civic engagement by providing accessible, independent, and fair investigations. Evidence from other jurisdictions suggests ombud  schemes  are  strongly  trusted  by  the  public.  The  Public  Services Ombudsman for Wales reported that 79% of people expressed confidence in the office.[33] The JPSO's recommendations would help prevent maladministration, drive  service  improvement,  and  address  the  root  causes  of  customer dissatisfaction, helping to reduce errors and wasted costs.

42. Many complainants turn to States Members with complaints, partially because of ease  of  access  and  partly  because  complaints  processes  can  be  unclear, confusing, difficult to navigate and the outcomes unsatisfactory. The JPSO will act as a resource for States Members to direct such complaints to or seek guidance on behalf of constituents. This would help representatives support constituents more effectively, free up time for policy related work and strengthen public trust and engagement, an important factor for civic participation and voter confidence.

Improvement to Public Services and performance management

"[P]ublic sector ombudsmen are expected to improve the way things are done for both the citizen and also for others; to get the authority to apologise; to flag a problem of general interest that should be in the public debate; and to get the authorities to change their behaviour."[34]

43. An OECD survey showed that ombud schemes considered their most important contribution to public governance reform to be improving public service delivery or improving the responsiveness of the public sector to the needs of citizens and businesses.[35] The OECD Public Integrity Handbook advises ombud schemes can help  improve  public  services  and  policies  by  drawing  on  insights  from  their investigations and strengthening effective complaint and allegation handling.[36] The JPSO model offers the advantage of engaging directly with citizens, providing first- hand insights into their public service experiences. This evidence is invaluable for identifying systemic issues and driving meaningful service delivery improvements.
44. Deputy Scott has emphasized the importance of performance management and the role of the JPSO in strengthening transparency and accountability, including amongst ALOs. The JPSO is expected to reduce maladministration and service failures by promoting best practice and helping public bodies resolve more issues before escalation. Its broader remit and higher visibility may increase complaint volumes, but this should drive service improvements and better outcomes for citizens.  By  encouraging  compliance  with  complaint-handling  standards  and addressing  areas  where  citizens  are  poorly  served,  the  JPSO  will  enhance processes, efficiency, and cost management across public services, improving accountability to taxpayers and service users.
45. Research  concerning  the  Office  of  the  Toronto  Ombudsman,  Canada, demonstrates that ombud schemes have a significantly positive impact on public administration.  They  promote  a  people-centred  approach  to  government  and advance equity and fairness in service delivery. Reported improvements included impartial and objective reviews of government services. Administrative processes became  more  streamlined,  alongside  a  reduction  in  organisational  silos  and inconsistencies. There was greater awareness of residents with additional needs observed alongside a stronger commitment to service excellence. Researchers found  that  the  ombudsperson's  role  was  respected  in  providing  fair  and constructive recommendations.[37] While some concerns were raised about the additional workload involved in cooperating with investigations and implementing recommendations, in Jersey's context this impact is expected to be offset to some extent by the workload currently generated by the Complaints Panel, where the scope of services covered is too narrow and the grounds for complaint has been too wide.

"Own initiative investigations are used to address the root cause of an issue that has given rise to a number of similar complaints. The findings can inform an early response to an issue before it escalates or can allow the  ombudsman  to  issue  recommendations  on  a  problematic  issue affecting  a  number  of  public  organisations.  Moreover,  own  initiative investigations can bring attention to matters of public interest as well as generate  discussion  on  policy  and  legislative  issues.  Finally,  such investigations can bring voices into the policy arena that seldom complain are  rarely  heard  or  are  unable  to  complain,  thereby  contributing  to improved access in policy making."[38]

46. Various models for ombud schemes in the UK have been considered during policy development over the past decade.[39] These range from individualist models, where the primary focus is on resolving individual complaints, to more holistic models that address systemic issues via own-initiative' investigations and by acting as a Complaint Standards Authority.[40] For redress bodies to improve administration and public  services,  they  must  exert  real-world  practical  impact  and  focus  on addressing systemic issues rather than isolated complaints. This might include issuing  thematic  reports  regarding  complaints  and  providing  guidance  or recommendations for improvements. The Public Services Ombudsman of Wales provides a good example of use of such thematic reports.[41] For the JPSO, a broader, more holistic approach is recommended to maximise opportunities for public-service improvement.

Return on investment

47. "Return  on  Investment  of  Effective  Complaints  Management:  public  services Organisations" (2020), led by the University of Newcastle, Australia, investigates how  public  services  organisations  in  Australia  manage  complaints  and  the associated  return  on  investment  ("ROI")  and  social  return  on  investment ("SROI").[42]

48. Using a mixed-method approach (literature review, interviews, focus groups, and complaint  file  analysis),  the  study  highlights  that  effective  public-services complaints management yields distinct benefits compared to the private sector, including improved public trust, reduced escalation costs, and enhanced service delivery. Measuring ROI in public organisations is complex due to intangible benefits and inconsistent data collection practices. The study recognises the broader social and organisational value of effective public-services complaints management.
49. The  report  proposes a  conceptual  framework  for  calculating  ROI  and  SROI, incorporating both tangible costs (staffing, training, escalation) and intangible benefits  (perceived  justice,  reputation,  client  cooperation).  Three  hypothetical scenarios illustrate how modest investments in complaint management can yield significant social returns.

SROI is calculated by the formula: SROI= 100*(Benefits – Costs)/Costs

50. While the study provides valuable insights into the benefits of effective complaint management, its findings are only broadly applicable to Jersey's ombudsperson project, as the case studies reflect different institutional contexts. The calculation of an accurate SROI for Jersey's ombudsperson project would be severely limited by immature data, such as lack of timesheets, challenges in quantifying non- monetised benefits, and a high degree of uncertainty around costs, such as staffing time taken up by complaints. Complaints vary widely across departments, with many unidentified factors.
51. Accurately calculating SROI would require advanced methodological development, additional  resources  including  statistical  expertise,  and  long-term  tracking  of complaint  files to  generate  reliable  data.  Given  the  complexity  and  resource demands, such modelling would not be proportionate to the current scope or purpose of policy development. The 2020 study may be used to generally support the idea that investment in complaint management can lead to beneficial social returns in the public services. There is strong evidence that ombud schemes can lead to improvements in administration and public-service delivery.
52. Research shows that ombud schemes can influence public services by improving administrative practices. Measuring this impact, whether social or financial is difficult, as there is limited research and a significant gap in understanding how administrative justice can influence improvement to efficiency in services. Despite this,  ombud  schemes  clearly  have  the  potential  to  help  drive  up  standards, strengthen compliance, and promote the implementation of lessons learned.[43]

Compliance: Acceptance and Enforcement of Findings and Recommendations

53. Research  shows  that  ombud  schemes  exert  greater  influence  through  a cooperative approach rather than a coercive one. Cooperative control generates more  policy  impact  than  the  adversarial  style  associated  with  administrative courts.[44] This is exemplified by the resistance sometimes seen to Complaints Panel recommendations, which adopt a more adversarial style. By using alternative dispute resolution methods, an ombudsperson can help to reduce policy tension, avoid defensive reactions from services, and encourage an openness to learning.
54. The JPSO would need to be provided with a range of tools to give it the teeth' to secure acceptance and implementation of findings and recommendations. The public consultation favoured a recommendation approach. However, the JPSO would not have a judicial or elected status constitutionally – it would be an independent body. The JPSO would therefore use a range of soft levers, such as respect in findings, the role of impartial watchdog, and cooperative engagement, to seek compliance. It could issue reports and negative publicity when compliance was not secured. It would also be supported by strong investigatory powers.
55. Recommendations  made  by  the  existing  Complaints  Panel  have  often  been rejected or left unimplemented by Government. This has raised concerns that the Panel lacks sufficient authority to influence compliance, ultimately limiting the level of redress available to complainants. Deputy Scott has engaged with Government officers and individuals with experience of the Panel, and concerns have been expressed regarding its methodology, which has contributed to the frequent non- implementation of its recommendations. The issue of being unable to agree or implement complaint reviewer recommendations places government in a difficult situation. Not accepting recommendations creates reputational damage and cost for government, while it also reduces the perceived effectiveness of complaint- handling bodies. Any challenge to processes might fundamentally damage the relationship between government and complaint reviewers. Ultimately, Deputy Scott considers that accountability requires political will behind it, perhaps assisted by recognition of the problems with credibility of existing processes and related reputational harms.
56. Evidence from other public-service ombud schemes in the UK demonstrates that these models are well respected and effective in influencing change through a range of levers.[45] There was a 99.4% compliance with the Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman recommendations in 2022-23.[46] For non-compliance with recommendations, the Public Services Ombudsman for Wales will issue a special report and publicise this.[47] Adopting this approach would ensure that the JPSO is perceived as an organisation with independence, influence, and authority.

57. It is anticipated that an Ombudsperson's professional expertise and commitment to promoting good governance and effective complaint handling will drive greater confidence, and therefore compliance with recommendations. An Ombudsperson who investigates matters within a clear framework should make Government participants  more  receptive  to  accepting  findings  and  recommendations. The legislative framework would strengthen the JPSO's authority by providing robust investigatory and reporting powers.

Consideration of Tribunal Services

58. Tribunals, in contrast to ombud schemes, act like courts to provide a formal legal forum that determines disputes through legally binding hearings. In Jersey, the Tribunal Service is a department of the Court Services which resolves disputes in specific  areas  of  law.  Appeals  regarding  regulatory  decisions  are  more appropriately dealt with by Tribunals.
59. Deputy Scott has explored options for introducing a tribunal system or a two-tier framework that combines a tribunal with the JPSO to strengthen compliance where recommendations are disregarded or not implemented. Under this model, the tribunal would have enhanced powers, including the authority to overturn decisions and order remedies, in contrast to the softer levers typically employed by an ombudsperson. A tribunal in the service area, while not determining points of law, could offer solutions subject to court review. While a two-tier system could offer potential  benefits,  it  would  entail  significant  additional  costs.  Lower-cost alternatives, such as appointing a court official to facilitate resolution between parties, may provide a more proportionate solution. The complaints process must have a clear and definitive end point; it is desirable that the ombudsperson should represent the final stage of review, with no additional tier or backstop beyond this mechanism. Particularly as the tribunal model was not strongly supported by the public consultation, it may be prudent to begin by establishing  a JPSO and assessing satisfaction levels with redress once the system is operational.
60. As a comparison, the Jersey Advisory & Conciliation Service ("JACS") works in parallel with, but impartially from, the Jersey Employment and Discrimination Tribunal. The operational costs for JACS in 2024 were £482,186, with 250 claims received.[48] While these figures provide a useful benchmark, they are not directly comparable,  as  JACS  is  a  specialist  body  focused  on  employment  matters, whereas an ombud scheme would cover a broad spectrum of public services and may require input from specialists or experts. JACS employs four staff members.[49] In contrast, a standard model for a broad-spectrum JPSO, covering areas such as health, is estimated by government officers to require around ten staff, including specialist caseworkers and occasional contracted experts.[50] The Judicial Greffe holds  budgetary  responsibility  for  the  Jersey  Employment  and Discrimination Tribunal and its day-to-day resources. Tribunal members are paid a day rate of £800 for chairs and £300 for lay members. All employment-related claims are referred to JACS, while non-work-related discrimination claims go to Citizens Advice Jersey.[51]

61. Tribunals already exist for Planning, Social Security, Health and Safety, Mental Health Review, Charity, and Tax[52] with relatively narrow jurisdictions. Appeals hearings by the Charity Tribunal, from available evidence, are infrequent, with many years without a hearing being held. The JPSO would need to integrate effectively with these bodies to avoid duplicating their functions, particularly around regulatory  decisions.  The  JPSO  could  help  reduce  pressure  on  tribunals  by resolving maladministration and service-failure issues earlier through alternative dispute resolution or mediation before matters escalated to tribunals. Such a model could improve efficiency across regulators but would require careful assessment of costs and potential jurisdictional overlap.

Cost of Public Services Ombudsperson

62. Following the "Feedback on the Public Services Consultation," the Chief Minister commissioned additional cost-benefit analysis and financial modelling for certain final-stage  complaint-handling  policy  options  (See  Appendix  III).  While  this modelling provided indicative cost estimates for various operational models, it did not account for potential or secondary public-service savings or cost benefits from establishing a JPSO, due to the complexity and resource-intensive nature of such modelling. The potential benefits of establishing a JPSO could include tangible efficiencies  across  the  public  sector  through  improved  services,  streamlined operations, and reduced costs associated with complaint resolution. Costs may be saved by preventing maladministration and service failures, which would otherwise require significant resources to rectify or result in financial losses for services. This report has also highlighted the potential qualitative social gains, such as enhanced public trust, improved service quality, greater civic engagement, and a stronger sense of justice for citizens able to seek more accessible redress.
63. Deputy Scott recommends that the establishment of an independent JPSO be pursued, but in a size-appropriate manner for an island jurisdiction, with due consideration of budgetary constraints and the optimal use of public funds. Further policy modelling is needed to determine how JPSO costs can be contained and how it should integrate with other ALOs to avoid duplication through joint working and shared resources. Table 4 outlines a range of cost-management options that should be explored to streamline establishment and operational costs and identify opportunities for cashable savings to support long-term funding.

 Table 4: Cost-Management of Ombudsperson Model

64. Deputy Scott highlights the valuable role of volunteers in the current Complaints Panel and notes that involving volunteers in the JPSO could help reduce costs, draw  on  their  experience,  and  strengthen  civic  engagement.  Many  ombud schemes use volunteers to enhance service delivery. For example, the UK's Pensions  Ombudsman  has  used  volunteer  advisors  to  help  support complainants.[53]
65. Introducing discretionary powers would enable the ombudsperson to determine whether  to  investigate  a  complaint  based  on  merit  and  allocate  resources effectively. For example, the UK's Local Government and Social Care Ombudsman exercises discretion when deciding whether to investigate a complaint and is supported by clear "Guidance on Jurisdiction." Discretionary factors including the Public Interest Test, Injustice Test, Fault Test, and Remedy Test are applied.[54] The JPSO would develop clear guidance to determine whether a complaint should be investigated and clearly defined remits that prevents scope creep' and associated cost increases.

66. Consideration should be given to distinguishing service complaints from staff conduct complaints. Deputy Scott recommends that the States Employment Board ("the SEB") in consultation with the JPSO, produce a code of ethics for public sector employees, and those of relevant ALOs. This will make it easier for the public to raise conduct concerns, helping to clarify when issues fall outside the JPSO's remit and should be addressed through alternative mechanisms, such as disciplinary matters or professional bodies.
67. Further work is needed to determine how the JPSO should work alongside bodies such  as  JOIC  and  the  C&AG  to  share  resources  and  reduce  duplication. Opportunities for pooling resources and expertise across complaints bodies could help prevent silos and inefficiencies. In particular, there may be scope for the JPSO and the C&AG to collaborate on own-initiative' investigations where systemic service  failure  is  evident.  Given  the  synergies  and  the  C&AG's  recognised independence and cost-control expertise, consideration could be given to locating the two bodies within the same organisational area and under similar  Public Accounts Committee ("the PAC") oversight. There could be potential to reduce the cost of Commissioner for Standards investigations by outsourcing investigatory work to the JPSO as a specialised, independent investigator.
68. While consideration is needed regarding the JPSO's permanent position within the public service structure, a pragmatic short-term solution would be to establish the JPSO as directly answerable to both the C&AG and the PAC. This approach would draw on the C&AG's established expertise in governance and cost control, as well as  the  PAC's  existing  constitutional  oversight  role,  thereby  supporting independence while maintaining strong accountability.
69. It is anticipated that there will be a cost to public bodies resulting from officer time needed to engage with the JPSO resolution process. While difficult to quantify, Deputy Scott considers that this is likely to be offset against the current cost of engaging  with  the  Complaints  Panel  and  the  JOIC,  given  the  sometimes burdensome and duplicated time costs associated with existing complaint-handling processes. In the longer term, these costs should be further offset by the JPSO's role in helping public bodies establish more effective complaint-handling systems.

ANNEX IV Discussion of Policy Options from Cost Benefit Analysis

1. The Chief Minister commissioned a cost-benefit analysis of final-stage complaint- handling options.[55] The estimates cover legislative development, establishment, and ongoing operational costs (without taking into account potential cost reductions from the use of volunteers). They outline different scenarios and operating models, and additional cost-management strategies may be required to balance financial constraints with public expectations.

Option 1: Business as Usual - Existing States of Jersey Complaints Panel £90k to £110k per annum – current funding

2. The Complaints Panel's current annual operating cost is approximately £100k. This covers:

• 1 x Grade 10 Officer

• 0.1 x Grade 15 Officer

• £5k in operating costs

3. These costs are spread across a number of officers who contribute to supporting the Complaints Panel alongside their core work for the States Greffe. The Panel is a  member  of  the  Ombudsperson  Association  under  the  Complaint  Handler membership category. The Complaints Panel system benefits from low running costs, as its independent members carry out their duties on a voluntary basis. Administrative and logistical support is provided by the States Greffe. The current framework is valued for providing a volunteer-led impartial route for resolving complaints.
4. The existing Complaints Panel system is comparable to the low-cost Tynwald Commissioner for Administration in the Isle of Man with a 2025-26 budget of £37,340. This receives a very low number of complaints, with the Commissioner providing this service on a part-time basis.[56]
5. Despite its cost-effectiveness, there are recognised weaknesses in the existing complaint-handling system, including the publication of reports containing personal information by the PPC. To address some of these issues, additional resource was appointed to support for the Complaints Panel. This is considered by the States Greffe as the most positive element of the policy development, providing improved accessibility to complainants. The States Greffe Specialist Secretariat produce the official reports arising from all Hearings of the Panel. The team triage enquiries from complainants and produce written summaries for consideration by the Chair. The States Greffe have noted challenges for some complainants due to additional needs or where English is not their first language. It is acknowledged that the current structure has limitations, particularly as improved accessibility to the complaints process has led to a significant rise in enquiries and caseload. This increase has placed growing pressure on existing resources, making it increasingly difficult to manage complaints effectively within the current framework.

6. The inefficiencies and risks outlined above create ongoing costs, including staff time and missed opportunities to learn from complaints and improve services. A more strategic  and  consistent  approach  would  enhance  transparency,  improve accessibility and redress, strengthen organisational learning, and drive service improvement. The absence of an ombud scheme also poses reputational risks for the Government of Jersey, particularly as an international finance centre.
7. Option 1 is not recommended as the current system has significant structural weaknesses. The existing Complaints Panel puts significant pressure on staff at the States Greffe to specialise outside of their core area of expertise.

Option 2: Non-legislative improvements to the current system £290k to £320k per annum

8. Some lower-cost, non-legislative improvements to the current complaint-handling system may offer a pragmatic and cost-effective alternative to establishing a fully independent ombudsperson. These improvements would build on and support the work of the existing Complaints Panel system. During 2024, the Complaints Panel Working Group improved accessibility, provided more transparent public-facing information, and introduced additional resource to support complainants.
9. One such improvement would be the introduction of a dedicated officer role within the Cabinet Office, at Grade 10 (£76k–£84k annually), piloted on a fixed-term basis. This officer would act as a central point of liaison between Government and the Complaints Panel. Their responsibilities would include triaging cases, supporting departments in resolving complaints before they reach a hearing, and providing guidance on how to engage effectively with the Complaints Panel. The officer could attend hearings where appropriate, helping to ensure consistency and improve the quality of departmental engagement. The officer would centrally record and monitor the implementation of Complaints Panel recommendations, ensuring that learning from complaints is fully embedded across Government.
10. Following improvements made by the Complaints Panel, the States Greffe has reported a significant increase in volume, with 20 new complaints and 83 enquiries recorded between June and October 2025. A minority of complex cases require substantial staff time and frequent contact with complainants. This growing demand has placed pressure on Secretariat Officers, who are currently providing complaints casework support alongside their core responsibilities supporting elected Members. The States Greffe has indicated that this arrangement is not sustainable. Officers have received additional training to manage increased call volumes, but the strain on resources presents some operational challenges.
11. The States Greffe considers that the existing provision could be enhanced by the recruitment of two dedicated officers. Based on an analysis of how operational  support is provided to the Complaints Panel; they have proposed new posts to meet demand:

• 1 x Grade 9 Caseworker[57]

• 1 x Grade 7 Administrator

12. When  the  newly  proposed  roles  are  combined  with  the  existing  cost  of  the Complaints Panel, the enhanced model would be an additional £290k to £320k per annum. This investment would leverage the existing low-cost structure of the Complaints Panel while improving the effectiveness of complaint handling within Government.  This  option  comes  slightly  under  budget,  with  the  potential  for operational and social benefits.
13. Option 2 is not recommended, as it risks undermining the States Assembly's 2018 decision, which approved the principle of establishing a Jersey Public Service Ombudsperson ("the JPSO"). The proposed JPSO has strong public and media support and is backed by extensive policy development and research showing that an independent ombudsperson is the most effective way to improve final-stage complaint handling and drive public-service improvement. Not establishing the JPSO would risk losing this progress and failing to meet public expectations.